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Summary  findings
Vietnam's ethnic minorities, who tend to live mostly in  But the minorities do not obtain lower retu-ns to all
remote rural areas, typically have lower living standards  characteristics. There is evidence of compensating
than the ethnic majority. How much is this because of  behavior. For example, pure returns to location - even
differences in economic characteristics (such as education  in remote, inhospitable areas -tend  to be higher for
levels and land) rather  than low returns to  minorities, though not high enough to overcomne  the
characteristics? Is there a self-reinforcing culture of  large consumption difference with the majority.
poverty in the minority groups, reflecting patterns of  The majority ethnic group's model of income
past discrimination?  generation  is a poor  guide on how to fight poverty
Van de Walle and Gunewardena find that differences  among ethnic minority groups. Nor is it enough to target
in levels of living are due in part to the fact that the  poor  areas to redress ethnic inequality. Policies must be
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household characteristics. They find differences in  changing the conditions that have caused their isolation
returns to productive characteristics to be the most  and social exclusion.
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Viet Nam has a large population of ethnic minorities that tend to have appreciably higher
concentrations of poverty than the country's Kinh majority.' The minority groups also tend to
be more concentrated in upland and mountainous areas, often with worse access to public
services and lacking basic infrastructure. In recent years, the government has targeted a
number of rural development policies to poor areas in which ethnic minorities are found.
Although there have been no rigorous evaluations, there is a seemingly widespread perception
that such policies have been largely unsuccessful in raising levels of living of the minority
groups.
In confronting this apparent failure, and noting frequent resistance to policy take up, the
(largely Kinh) bureaucrats have tended to argue that the problem is the backwardness,
ignorance, superstition or irrationality of the minorities (Jamieson 1996). For example, district
health officials-puzzled  by why ethnic minorities visit shamans instead of commune health
care centers where they benefit from fee exemptions and free medicines-have  attributed
minority ill-health to "superstition and backwardness" (Mountain Rural Development
Programme (MRDP) et al. 1999). An agricultural extension official quoted in E klof(1995:5)
explains "Those farmers who adopt a new technology are labeled progressive, those who
don't are backward. But maybe the technology is not appropriate-still  the extension workers
will try to convince the "backward" farmer to adopt it."
A dissenting view argues that the policies have failed, and sometimes even further
disadvantaged minorities, because they are premised on assumptions and models that simply
do not apply to the circumstances of ethnic minorities (Jamieson 1996). In this interpretation,
the minorities have over centuries developed complex farming systems and indigenous
practices and knowledge that are well-adapted to their agro-economic environments. Culture,
environment and identity are all strongly interrneshed. Piecemeal policy interventions that
ignore the overall context are thus doomed to being rejected or to disappointing outcomes.
When policies are additionally imbued with prejudice and majority group ethnocentrism they
further result in a fraying of indigenous customs and identity, and can lead to greater
marginalization.'  Furthermore, since many of the policies are targeted to "ethnic minority
'There  is considerable evidence to support this view. For example see Jamieson (1996), Ministry of
Planning and Investment (MIP) (1996), Rambo (1997), Haughton and Haughton (1997), and Dollar and Glewwe
(1998).
2Negative  views of the minorities, including that they are poorer for "cultural" reasons, and will improve
their situation only by being more like the Kinh, are not uncommon among Viet Nam's majority. Evans (1992)
relates such attitudes on the part of Vietnamese anthropologists. Also see MIP (1996), Nakamura (1996) and
Rambo (1997). Similar attitudes to China's minorities by China's Han ethnic majority are reported (Blum 1992;
Gladney 1994).
1areas," not minority households, benefits may well be captured by Kinh households living in
these same areas.
Many interventions, from the education system to agricultural research and extension do
appear to be premised on Kinh lowland agro-models and behavior, including cultural nornns
(Jamieson 1996, Rambo 1997, MRDP et al. 1999). For example, although members of some
minority groups do not know the national language, government services and outreach are
rarely in minority languages. Agricultural research and extension have not focused on crops
and agro-economic systems prevalent in upland areas, but typically on wet rice cultivation and
in recent years, cash crops. Few in the uplands have suitable land for the former while the
latter bypasses poor minority households who tend to live far from main roads and markets,
and do not have access to complimentary inputs. The education system follows a nationally
set curricula that, it has been argued, is largely irrelevant to local realities and needs.
A central question in this debate is whether the sarne model generates incomes for
majority and minority groups. This paper addresses that question and in doing so aims to
better understand the causes of observed differences in living standards between the minority
and majority ethnic groups in Viet Nam. We ask how important differences in economic
characteristics-reflecting  access to schooling, land, and other factors-are  in explaining
differences in welfare.  Since Viet Nam's ethnic minorities frequently live in isolated, remote
areas, a central question is also how important location is to levels of living. How much does
where you live within the country shape the returns to your characteristics, and how does the
answer depend on ethnicity?
It is possible however, that given equal productive endowments and location, the
minorities receive lower returns as could arise from current or past discrimination. A
structural difference in the models deterrnining incomes would help explain the conflicts over
policy noted above. The paper investigates the degree to which differences in living standards
are attributable to disparate returns to household characteristics. In short, is it a common
model but different endowments that create the income inequality between these groups-as
is implicitly assumed in much current policy making-or  are there deeper structural
differences in the returns to endowments?
The paper also tests for signs of behaviors by ethnic minorities that compensate, at least
partially, for differences in returns to productive factors. In poor, rural, largely subsistence
agriculture economies, one would expect opportunities for discrimination against ethnic
minorities to be greater in some activities-such  as those involving interactions with the
government or labor markets-than  in others. If there is in fact discrimination, and it is not
feasible to discriminate against all activities, one expects the minorities to develop
comparative advantage, and possibly absolute advantage, in activities that can't be so easily
discriminated against.  Depending on what those activities are, this could in turn further
reinforce ethnic differences in the longer-term.
2One finds discussions of not dissimilar phenomena in the U.S. and European literatures on
poverty and social exclusion, whereby a socially or economically excluded group retreats into
patterns of behaviors, or survival strategies, that differ from those of the dominant group (for
example, Loury 1999 and Silver 1994). Although welfare enhancing to the excluded group in
the short run, it is believed that such behavior entails a "culture of poverty" thalt  tends also to
increase social differentiation and to reduce prospects for escaping poverty in the longer term.
In Viet Nam, casual empiricism gives credence to the possibility of a similar process. The
ethnic minorities are generally settled in more remote areas, and there is evidence that they
engage in different production and land tenure practices and often specialize in the cultivation
of non-traditional, and sometimes illegal, crops. Residential differentiation may well partly
reflect historical minority preferences to live near ethnically similar households and to be
represented by such households on local governing bodies. A push factor might also be
present reflecting similar preferences among the majority.
These issues have bearing on appropriate policy responses to ethnic inequality. A
common, and natural, policy response in settings such as this is to target extra resources to
designated "minority areas."  For example, Viet Nam's  Commission for Ethnic Minorities and
Mountain Areas (CEMMA) is entrusted, as its name suggests, with programs focusing on the
country's  minority groups, but also others living in mountainous areas. Its programs do not
make much of a distinction between the Kinh majority and the ethnic minority households
living within mountainous "minority areas." 3
If the main source of ethnic disparities in levels of living is indeed geographic, and intra-
area disparities are a secondary issue, then current interventions targeting poor areas with high
concentrations of minorities can be expected to work well. If instead we find substantial intra-
area disparities, the issue then arises as to how much they reflect differences in readily
observable economic characteristics such as schooling, versus differences in returns to the
same characteristics. Do differences in living standards persist once we control for geographic
fixed effects and household characteristics? What evidence is there for differentiated
behavioral patterns between the minority and majority groups? The answers can help guide
the current policy debate about how to redress welfare differentials between the ethnic
minorities and less disadvantaged groups in Viet Nam.
The paper begins with a review of past approaches to the economic analysis of ethnic
disparities, and how the paper's methods differ. Section 3 describes the household-level data
set used for the analysis. The paper then explores the determinants of living standards and
how they differ between the groups.  Section 4 describes the econometric specification, while
sections 5 and 6 discuss the results. A final section summarizes the paper's  conclusions.
3 A similar policy operates in China's ethnic areas  just across the border from Viet Nam, and there too the
policy does not appear to be targeted within the declared "minority villages."
32.  Framework  of Analysis
Investigations of ethnic disparities in living standards in developing countries often rely on
descriptive decompositions of aggregate poverty and/or inequality between ethnic groups.
There is a literature that focuses on the contribution of ethnic disparities to overall measures
of inequality (Anand 1983 and Glewwe 1988). One may of course be concerned about ethnic
inequalities in living standards quite independently of their bearing on overall income
inequality. Ethnic inequality may well be of concern because of the implications for social
functioning and the nature of economic development more broadly.  In this paper we take as  -
our starting point that ethnic disparities are important, and focus instead on the causes of those
disparities.
There have been attempts at identifying ethnic discrimination through analysis of wage
earnings disparities (for example, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994). This draws on a
standard technique in the labor economics literature, known as the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition (Blinder 1973 and Oaxaca 1973). Group-specific earnings functions are
estimated and the parameters used to decompose the mean inter-group wage differential into
that which is attributable to differences in productive characteristics and that which may be
attributable to differences in returns to characteristics, as might arise from discrimination.
To see how this approach works, let the reduced-form model for the log of earnings
th (Wij ) for the it  individual in the jth group be written as:
(1)  lnW,j =  Xij  3j  +  eij,
where Xij represents a vector of individual characteristics such as education and work
experience, with corresponding parameters fj, while eij is a zero mean error tenn that is
assumed to be uncorrelated with Xij. Since the fitted regression passes through the means, this
can be rewritten in a form that decomposes the mean wage differentials between the groups as
follows:
(2)  lnW* - lnW*  =  Pm(X*m  - X* )  +  X  (f3m - De)
[Total difference]  [Characteristics]  [Structure]
where the lnW*s and X*s represent the predicted mean (log) earnings and the mean
characteristics of the respective majority (m) and ethnic minority (e) groups. The first right-
hand-side component in (2) is the earnings differential attributable to differences in the
4observed characteristics of the groups, in this case weighted by the parameters estimated for
the majority.4 The second component is that attributable to between-group differences in the
returns to given individual characteristics. The labor economics literature refers to the second
component as the difference due to "structure."
One obvious drawback of the above approach in many developing country settings is that
it is limited to the wage labor market. This is not very satisfactory when self-emlployment  in
the agricultural or informal sectors is the source of livelihood for most households, and
arguably even more so for disadvantaged ethnic groups. Past analyses of ethnic disparities in
developing countries have therefore tended to be limited to the minority of urban formal
sector employees.
A second issue on which others have also remarked, concerns the conventional method's
implicit definition of discrimination as lower returns for identical productive characteristics
(for example, Gunderson 1989). Clearly, differences in mean characteristics between groups
can themselves be the product of past unequal treatment and disadvantage. For example, prior
discrimination may have meant no access to credit or being pushed into geographical areas of
low natural potential. Such treatment will have lowered the returns to given characteristics but
also resulted in poorer productive characteristics. This doesn't invalidate the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition, but it does have bearing on its interpretation.
These are compelling concerns in a low income transitional economy such as Viet Nam.
Markets are thin and mobility is limited. In this environment it is even harder to believe that
people have themselves chosen their characteristics. If a specific ethnic group was forced at
some time in the past into adopting a specific set of low return characteristics--such  as living
in mountainous areas-then  the definition of discrimination in terms of lower returns to the
same characteristics is clearly problematic. (This need not mean that those same-
characteristics are endogenous to current living standards; the deviations from mean
characteristics within the ethnic group can still be orthogonal to the error term.)
The standard method for analyzing wage differentials does not identify an explicit role for
geography. There are two reasons why one should allow for geographic effects. The first is
that in this economy one important characteristic determining living standards is where you
live. Mobility has been considerably limited in recent decades. Apart from government
resettlement prograrns to new economic zones, during the 1980s mobility was tightly
controlled through a system of residence permits, which were necessary to obtain subsidized
essential goods (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1998). Reforms
introduced at the end of 1986 largely removed the subsidies but severe institutional
constraints continued to impede migration. Access to government services and participation in
private transactions to do with land, housing and credit are still firrnly linked to the system of
4Note  that since  the discrimination  free wage structure  is not known,  choice  of the reference  group  is
arbitrary.
5residence permits (UNDP 1998). Temporary migration of individuals to urban areas has risen
but the movement of entire rural households to other rural areas was still relatively rare in the
early 1990s. So it can be argued that this is a setting in which location is likely to be a causal
determinant of levels of living.
For similar areas in neighboring Southwest China, there is also evidence of significant
geographic externalities that suggest that households with identical characteristics would have
different rates of consumption growth depending on where they live (Jalan and Ravallion
1998).5  In this context, a possible explanation for ethnic differences in living standards is
differences in location of the groups and nothing to do with discrimination within a
geographical area.
A second reason to allow for geographical effects is that omitting them could severely bias
estimates of the returns to non-geographic characteristics. In this setting, a potentially serious
source of bias is likely to be geographic heterogeneity in the quality of (for example) land and
education.  It can be argued that a good deal of the latent quality differences that one expects
to matter to living standards are going to be geographically correlated-to  vary more between,
than within communes in Viet Nam. This is obvious for land, but may well be no less
important for education, given decentralization and a high degree of self-financing at local
(commune) level of teachers, school materials and supplies. By introducing geographic
effects, one has a better chance of more accurately estimating the returns to the observed
characteristics.
Motivated by these concerns, we will depart from the standard approach to analyzing
ethnic inequality in certain ways. Given that labor markets are so thin in rural north Viet Narn,
instead of examining wages, we focus on a broader measure of individual living standards, or
welfare, and conduct the analysis at the more appropriate level of the household. We ask
whether there are ethnic differences in living standards controlling for household
characteristics, and allowing for geographic effects. Only in the (and, as we have argued,
implausible) special case in which the geographic effects are uncorrelated with the economic
characteristics of households will such a specification give the same results as the standard
specification of (1) in which e is treated as a zero mean white noise error term.
We will not, however, interpret the structure component as current "discrimination." Such
an interpretation is also questionable when one thinks of the likely dynamics of the income
generation process. Structural differences may exist in the absence of current discrimination,
due, for instance, to a history of past group disadvantage with a continuing legacy for the
returns to economic characteristics. Longstanding differences in group behavior will be
embodied in the model parameters for current levels of living. These issues are clearly more
relevant to examining living standards than wages, where the market mechanism pushes
5  Strong geographic effects on living standards are also found in countries with few obvious restrictions on
geographic mobility; see Nord (1998) for the United States and Ravallion and Wodon (1999) for Bangladesh.
6towards similar returns to productive characteristics. No such mechanism applies to a broader
income concept in settings with little or no mobility. So, quite apart from issues of
discrimination, understanding how much disparities are due to structure versus different
characteristics remains key to explaining the causes of inequality and designing appropriate
policy. Again, the decomposition remains useful, but its interpretation is different to that in
the literature on wage discrimination.
3.  Data
To investigate the situation of ethnic minorities in Viet Nam, the study uses the 1992-93 Viet
Nam Living Standards Measurement Survey (VNLSS), a nationally representative, integrated
household survey based on sound sampling methods and geared to minimizing non-sampling
errors. The survey was implemented by the Government Statistical Office with donor funding
and technical support. Though administered to each household during only two visits, two
weeks apart, the VNLSS allows for data entry to be done in the field and performs range and
consistency checks so that any discrepancies can be checked and corrected by re-interviewing
the household. It asks detailed questions on many aspects of living standards including
household and individual socio-economic characteristics, consumption expenditures, incomes
and production. We limit our sample to the 2,720 rural households sampled in what we
loosely call northern Viet Nam, comprising provinces in the Northern Uplands, North Coast,
Red River, the Central Coast and the Central Highlands. The last is usually considered part of
South Viet Nam but since it is a mountainous, border area with a historically high
concentration of minority population we include it in the analysis. Households of Chinese
origin tend to be relatively well-off in Viet Nam and, since our objective is to iinvestigate  the
determinants of the living standards of relatively under-privileged groups, we lump them
together with the majority Kinh population. This gives us a sample of 2,254 majority
households (Kinh and Chinese) and 466 ethnic minority households living in 85 communes. 6
The study's geographical coverage reflects a number of important considerations. Our aim
is to ensure sufficient variation across minority and majority populations and to cover areas
where ethnic minorities reside. A fiurther  reason for excluding the Mekong Delta and South
East regions is that the rural economy appears to function quite differently there. For historical
reasons, these areas had more developed land and labor markets in 1992-93 than did the rest
of Viet Nam.
We use household per capita expenditures as our indicator of welfare. There are
compelling arguments for using expenditures instead of income to measure well-being.
6 There  are 54 ethnic  groups  in Viet Nam of which  the majority  Kinh  comprise  81.2  percent of the
population.  Six of the largest  minority  groups  are represented  in our  data: the Thai, Tay,  Muong,  Khome,  Nung,
and H'mong.
7Consumption can to some extent be smoothed against income fluctuations. There are also
serious concerns about income measurement errors in this context. As Rambo (1997) writes:
Perhaps because many of the commodities being exchanged are illegal (opium,
medicinal plants traded to China) or do not fall within the standard categories
used for economic data collection (minor forest products), the real extent to
which the mountain minorities are already deeply involved in the market nexus
is not frlly recognized. Rambo (1997: 25).
The existence of illegal income sources could severely bias income-based measures of
ethnic inequality, but is less likely to matter to consumption based measures. The survey
focuses effort on carefully collecting consumption expenditures.  In addition, expenditures
typically provide a better indicator of the current standard of living in poor agricultural
economies. They are deflated by region specific poverty lines to deal with spatial cost-of-
living differentials.  Monetary amounts are in Vietnamese Dong.
The unconditional means from our data help establish that the minorities do indeed
have lower standards of living on average than the majority. Table 1 gives descriptive
statistics for the two groups in our sample and indicates a mean per capita household
expenditure for the minority groups of just under three quarters the average for the majority.
The incidence of poverty is calculated to be 60 percent for the Kinh and Chinese and 80
percent for the minorities. 7 Figure 1 plots the poverty incidence curves giving the cumulative
distribution functions of per capita expenditures for every possible poverty line. It shows the
disparity in living standards more starkly and indicates first order dominance. The result that
poverty incidence is higher among minority households is also robust to different equivalent
scales. 8 Non-income indicators of poverty in Table 1 show the same pattern. Education
attainments are clearly lower on average for the minorities. A much higher proportion belong
to illiterate households (12 versus 3 percent). For 27 percent of the minority but only 12
percent of the majority households, the most educated member had primary education, while
53 percent of the latter had a member who attended high school compared to only 31 percent
of minority households.
Given our interest in the role of geographical disparities, it is also useful to examine
how community endowments vary across the groups. Table 2 presents means over both
groups on whether certain attributes, facilities, and services are found in a household's
'For details  on the poverty  lines  see Dollar  and Glewwe  1998.  When  we use a lower cutoff  point  of two-
thirds of the poverty  line the prevalence  drops to 24 percent  for the majority  group  and 45 percent for the ethnic
minorities.
s We treated  the original  per capita  poverty  line (z) as the per capita expenditure  needed  to escape  poverty  at
average  household  size. So, the poverty  line  per equivalent  single  person is z n / no  where n is average
household  size and 0 is the size elasticity.  At any  given 0--tested from 0 to I at intervals  of 0. 1-the  poverty
ranking  does  not change.
8commune of residence as well as mean distances from the commune center to the closest
facilities. Access to infrastructural facilities and services tends to be worse for the minorities.
For example, they are much less likely to live in a commune with a perrnanent (as opposed to
a periodic) market, a radio station, a health care center and a lower secondary school. Of
course, these data tell us nothing about the quality of the facilities, which could well also vary
across communes. Distances to the closest facility are also generally larger, with larger
variance across communes. Interestingly, the variance in community characteristics across
geographical areas tends almost always to be larger for minority households. Finally, the two
indicators of non-farm employment opportunities-whether  unskilled labor work is available
and whether there is a large commercial enterprise in the commune-are  both more frequent
in communes where majority households reside.
A look at household income sources further indicates less diversified livelihoods for the
minorities.  Among minority households all but 26 percent (standard deviation of 2 percent)
derive their incomes solely from own-account farming activities, while 56 percent (standard
deviation of 1 percent) of majority households have non-farm incomes sources. The ethnic
majority more often combine farming with self-employment in non-farn  enterprises or wage-
employment.
4.  Econometric Specification
Following the discussion in section 2, household welfare is assumed to be a function of
household and community level endowments and other attributes. To explore the determinants
of welfare we regress the log of per capita expenditures (Wij,) for the i'th household in
minority or majority group j living in commune k, against household characteristics (Xijk)  and
geographic effects (T1ij):
(3)  lnWijk  =  PiXijk + nlij  +  Fijk
where Sijk is a random error term, orthogonal to the explanatory variables.
Household characteristics include demographics: proportions of children in the 0 to 6 and
7 to 16 year brackets, proportions of male and female adults, and a series of dummy variables
describing whether household structure consists of a single individual, a coupJle,  a couple with
one, two, or three or more children, a three generation household, or some "other"
composition. A few variables are specific to the head of household: age and age squared, and
9gender. We also include a dummy variable for whether the household receives remittances
from relatives abroad. 9
Household human capital is measured as a series of dummy variables for the highest
education level of the member who has completed the most formal schooling. For example, if
the most educated member attended middle school, that dummy has a value of one while all
the others are zero. This specification allows us to measure the incremental returns to extra
years or levels of education. Education is assumed to be pre-determined to current
consumption. However, there could still be omitted variable bias. For example, one likely
omitted variable is the quality of education. Disparate returns to schooling across the groups
could be picking up either a difference in the returns to quality, or a dissimilarity in how
differences in quality affect the quantity of schooling. We return to this point below.
We also include as explanatory variables the total area of different types of land cultivated
by the household in the last 12 months. Land is disaggregated into area of irrigated and non-
irrigated annual crop land, perennial crop land, forest, water surface (most often used for the
culture of fish), and other land (consisting of vacant lots, bald hills, burnt and fallow land,
river banks, road and dike sides).'" To measure land quality we enter the shares of total
irrigated and non-irrigated land recorded in the survey as locally rated of good quality. Land
markets did not exist at the time of data collection. But even though households did not
flexibly and freely choose land, the possibility of endogeneity can not be fully dismissed here
either. Within communes, land allocations were made by local administrations. Original
household allocations of annual crop land often date back to 1988 and were usually made on a
per labor unit basis and allowing for quality differentials and water access. Other land types
(perennial, forest and other land) were distributed as late as 1991 or later, and appear to have
frequently been subject to greater local discretion." For example, Donovan et al. (1997) report
great variation in how the national land tenure regulations have been applied in the country's
northern regions. They found that common criteria for distributing forest and other land
included evidence of sufficient household labor, capital, and ability to make investments.
They also describe numerous instances of apparent favoritism in forest and other land
allocation, with outcomes commonly favoring privileged village households.
'Note  that, in as much as it is a dunmiy variable, it is not affected by differences in levels of remittances
among recipients. While there may nonetheless be endogeneity concerns about this variable, we believe it would
be worse to exclude it. The dummy could well proxy for important unobserved factors that affect consumption,
such as the household's  connections and political clout in the commune and at higher levels of government.
10Any swidden land that was cultivated during the last year is included in annual crop land. Swidden land is
more commonly cultivated by the minorities. Unfortunately, the survey does not collect information on area of
swidden land left fallow in the last year but available to the household.
1' For example, see the commune case studies reported in Donovan et al. (1997, vol 2). Also see Jamieson
(1996).
10The process  of local  land allocation  suggests  possible  endogeneity,  whereby  some  land
assets are a function  of latent factors  such as local  political  influence  or access  to capital  that
also influence  consumption  but are not in the regression.  The land coefficients  then  reflect
both the returns to land and to those omitted  variables.  We will return to this point when
discussing  the interpretation  of our results.
Finally,  we include  dummy  variables  for the commune  in which  the houselhold  lives.  As
emphasized  in section  2, in this particular  setting  it can be argued  that location  is largely
exogenous  and has a direct causal  effect  on living standards.  Allowing  for commune  fixed
effects  also helps deal with potential  bias in other  parameters  of interest.  As also discussed  in
section  2, latent  factors  that may  be correlated  to included  variables,  and directly  influence  the
dependent  variable,  are likely  to be geographically  correlated.  Communes  are relatively small
and the commune  effects  should  adequately  capture  differences  in inter-commune  quality of
land and education  attributes,  local infrastructural  development,  geo-environmental  attributes,
prices, and other community  level factors.  This should  help  deal with possible  endogeneity  of
the included  variables-notably land  and education.  There may of course  still be some  bias
due to intra-commune  differences  in omitted  variables-including possible  factors  influencing
within commune  land  allocations  as noted  above-but  we can do nothing  about this.
We run two sets of regressions.  The first includes  household  level characteristics
excluding  location.  Since  differences  in the returns to those  characteristics  may well reflect
where one lives, we then  run the regressions  with commune  fixed  effects  and test for the
influence  of locational  factors  on the returns  to household  characteristics.  In all regressions,
we estimate  the standard  errors using  the Huber-White  correction  for heteroscedasticity  and
we correct  for the non-zero  covariance  within communes  due to sample  design  (using  the
robust  cluster  option  in STATA  6).
5. Discussion of Results
Table  3 presents  the regression  results  for the majority  and minority  groups.  Chow tests on
these regressions  reject the null hypothesis  that the parameters  are the same for the two groups
(F= 4.64 (34, 84))  when geographical  fixed  effects  are excluded.  Testing  the joint restrictions
is trickier  when controlling  for fixed  effects  since  the number  of variables  is now different  in
the two regressions  as a result  of both groups  not being found in all communes.  Chow tests on
regressions  limited  to the sample  of 704 households-366 majority  and 338
minority-residing in common  communes  also convincingly  rejects identical  parameters  both
without  and with fixed  effects. 12
12 This is true using ordinary  robust  and robust  cluster standard  errors.  However,  on the model  estimated
with  the latter, we can only  test up to 21 constraints  at a time  (equal  to the number  of clusters,  minus  one).
11Subtracting the minority from the majority regression (both with commune effects) tells us
about the contribution to ethnic inequality of a change in specific household attributes,
controlling for commune of residence. The constant term-combining  the joint effects of the
excluded dummy variables-contributes  positively to inequality between the groups, as do the
education variables, the receipt of remittances dummy, household size, the household
composition variables, the share of good quality irrigated land and forest land. Other types of
land, a male household head and household structures other than the left-out "couple," reduce
inequality. The following discussion goes into more detail.
Demographic effects. Although on balance the size of the demographic variable
parameters favors the majority group, demographic effects are similar across the groups and
regressions with and without fixed effects. Household size has a strong negative impact on
welfare. Compared with the omitted share of members aged under six, higher shares of all
other members have significant positive impacts on living standards. The household structure
variables have no apparent explanatory power with the exception of the negative effect of
being a one child couple compared to a couple alone for the majority when we control for
location.
Returns to education. Striking differences arise in the education parameter estimates. They
are consistently positive and significant for both groups but the returns to education are
substantially higher for the minority in the regression not allowing for geographic effects. An
increment to per capita consumption expenditures of 75 percent of original consumption is
indicated as a result of the most educated member completing primary schooling. The
cumulative impact of completing middle school is to raise per capita consumption by 84
percent, and of high school to more than double it. By contrast, returns for the majority are
respectively: 22, 34 and 49 percent over original consumption per person. The cumulative
advantages of education to the ethnic minorities are maintained through vocational or
university education though the returns are diminishing the higher the education level.
Looking at the non-fixed effects regression results, one might feel justified in concluding that
as education expands, this will in itself reduce and eliminate ethnic inequality, obviating any
need to target.
However, given the impediments to migration, a generalized policy of education
expansion is not the solution. Education is closely linked with where a minority household
resides, so that once one introduces the geographic effects, the results change dramatically:
differences in the returns to education between ethnic groups are reversed. Although impacts
on minority living standards remain positive and significant, their magnitude declines to the
point of being lower than those estimated for the majority for all but primary schooling. 1 3 By
13 We cannot  Teject  the null that the education  coefficients  are the same  when tested  on the smaller  sample
of communes  where  both groups  live. Although  the returns  are higher  for the majority  with fixed  effects  for all
except  primary,  collinearity  between  education  and other  regressors  is no doubt  raising  the standard  errors.
12contrast, the majority parameter estimates are much less affected by omitting ithe  geographic
effects. This is shown in figure 2 which plots the cumulative returns to education relative to
being illiterate for both groups with and without the fixed effects. Note that the figure shows
the proportionate gains to consumption. Since the proportionate gains (with fixed effects) are
higher for the majority, and they are also on average richer, the level consumpition  gains from
education must be even higher for the majority.
In other words, we find that the differences in returns are strongly associated with where a
minority household lives. There are large unconditional returns to schooling to minorities, but
the difference upends when comparing ethnic minority and non-minority households in the
same place. The ethnic differences in unconditional returns thus arise from the geographic
distribution of ethnic groups such that the real difference between high education, high
consumption minority households and those with low education and low consumption is in
where they live. Under-developed labor markets and considerable immobility allow this to
happen.
These results suggest a substantial bias in the estimated returns to schoolinlg  for the
minorities when not controlling for commune effects. The key omitted characteristic is likely
to be the quality of education, which is itself determined geographically for the minority
group. Our results are consistent with a situation in which the places where living standards
are higher for the minority are places where education quality tends to be better, and the latent
quality differences are positively correlated with quantities of education." 4 However, we do
not find a similar bias for the majority (noting that the regressions with and without fixed
effects are similar for the majority). Either there are few quality differences for the majority,
or the differences are uncorrelated with differences in observed quantities. We cannot say
which it is.
The seemingly high returns to minority education suggested by the model without
commune effects appear to be due not to education but to the combined effect of restrictions
on migration and geographical differences in the provision of education services. These have
simultaneously created large intra-commune differences in consumption and education levels
for the minorities. This results in high estimated returns to education (without fixed effects),
and suggests potentially large returns to minority migration. The fact that this does not happen
for majority households (whose mobility is also restricted) suggests that the provision of
education has been more equitable across majority areas. 15
Notice that  both conditions  are required.  The omitted  variable  bias is the coefficient  of the omitted
variable  in the main regression  times  the regression  coefficient  of the excluded  variable  on the included  variable.
1  When  we drop the dunmmy  for household  receives  income  from  relatives  abroad,  the results  are ahlost
identical,  though  with slightly  higher  returns  to education  for both groups.  This  is consistent  with  it proxying  for
omitted  indicators  of, for example,  political  importance  in the comrmunity.  Leaving  it in is likely  to give  better
estimates  of the returns  to education.  The dummy  is non-zero  for only 3 percent  of majority  and 1 percent  of
minority  households.  (Details  available  from  the authors.)
13Returns to land. Joint significance tests of the linear and quadratic terms shows that
perennial, water surface, and irrigated land are significant at the 5 percent level in all
regressions, except for irrigated land in the minority without fixed effects, where it is
significant at the 10 percent level. Non-irrigated land has little explanatory power in any
regressions. Other land is significant (5 percent level) in both majority regressions, and in the
minority fixed effects at the 10 percent level. In addition, the forest land variables are
significant in the majority fixed effects (5 percent).
To see how the returns to land assets vary across the groups we create figure 3, which
(analogously to figure 2 for education) plots proportionate consumption gains for different
amounts of land relative to having no land. To deal with the different land types, we create a
land bundle (identical for both groups) combining the relativities of all land types at the mean.
This bundle therefore contains a fixed share of (good and bad quality) irrigated and non-
irrigated land, and other land types and is expressed in different total amounts. Thus, using the
parameter estimnates  for each group, we plot the group-specific proportionate consumption
gains from different quantities of land, holding quality constant.' 6
The regression without geographic effects gives implausible results: returns to land for the
majority are actually negative. For both groups returns appear to be underestimated. These
results are consistent with the land parameters in the regressions without fixed effects picking
up the effects of omitted cross-commune quality of land variations that one would expect to
be negatively correlated with quantities of land. If high quality is associated with lower
quantities of land across locations, then returns to land will be underestimated unless one
controls for commune effects. We also find that the marginal returns to aggregate land are
higher for the ethnic minority groups, especially controlling for where they live." 7
Analogously to figure 2, we note that the differences in the gains to levels of consumption
will be lower than the plotted proportionate gains since the minority group is poorer.
However, the gains in levels are still larger than for the majority group given that the
proportionate difference in returns to land (with fixed effects) is so much larger than the
proportionate difference in consumption.
The minorities obtain higher increments to consumption from extra land ceteris paribus
(figure 3).  This is the opposite of what we would expect if there was a bias due to
endogeneity of administrative land allocation, as discussed in section 4. A priori, one expects
omitted attributes such as access to credit or political clout to be more strongly correlated with
land allocation for the majority group. When we examine individual land types, we find
i
6 At zero land, per capita consumption of the groups will differ. The graph should not be interpreted as
saying that the minorities have higher consumption at any given amount of land.
17 We tested the results by running a number of altemative specifications including one with total land, total
land squared and shares of each type of land making up the total to take into account land type and quality. The
pattem evidenced in figure 3 is closely repeated each time. We therefore stayed with our functional form as it is
more flexible, and hence econometrically preferred, than the alternatives.
14similar patterns for all but forest land, where returns favor the majority. The available
evidence points to the allocation of forest land being more subject to idiosyncratic household
characteristics than other land types (Donovan et al. 1997). The returns to forest land may
reflect an over-estimation of the coefficients due to latent omitted variables. Btut  this cannot
explain our results for aggregate land.
Clearly, there must be one or more inputs that ethnic minority households are supplying in
greater quantity so as to obtain a larger output from the same land. What could that be? The
available evidence makes it implausible that the minority households are less credit
constrained at any given amount of land and generally have access to more productive inputs
such as machinery or extension services than the majority." 8 One interpretation for these
findings is that minority households are working harder on their own land to compensate for
their lack of off-farm opportunities.  In general, minority households have lower levels of
education, larger size, fewer children in school, fewer outside non-farrn economic
opportunities, and face an even thinner labor market than others given where they live. They
then have little choice but to work harder on their land." 9 Mean hours worked on one's own
household farn  from the survey data provide strong corroboration for this intelpretation.
Converting yearly hours worked per household into eight hour day equivalents gives a mean
of 397 days across the majority households versus 697 days for minority households. 20
Unfortunately we are unable to express time worked per land area since the survey provides
no information on labor time by land type. Instead, we run a regression of the log of total
hours worked on one's farm for the entire sample against land variables (inclucding  squared
terms and the land quality variables) and a dummy taking the value one if the household is
minority and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient is 0.45 (t=4.75). This stuggests  close to
50 percent higher labor time for minority households at given amounts and quality of land. 2'
A likely contributory factor is that the minorities as a whole are more adeptl  at exploiting
high-return, non-traditional, agricultural and forest products. This is likely to require an
intimate knowledge of the ecosystem, inputs and how remunerative certain non-traditional
18 Lower  access is documented  in, for example,  MRDP  et al. 1999,  and Jamieson,  1996.
19 There  is a possible  alternative  explanation  for the higher  returns  to land for the minorities.  As mentioned,
more  among  the minority  cultivate  swidden  land.  If they also generate  income  from the unobserved  swidden
land left fallow,  then the results  could reflect  omitted  variable  bias.  However,  the direction  of the bias will
depend  on whether  the area of fallow  swidden  land is positively  or negatively  correlated  with currently
cultivated  land area. A positive  correlation  would  result in an overestimation  of the returns  to land and could
explain  our results,  while a negative  correlation  would  underestimate  retums.  We think  it unlikely  that a positive
correlation  is a general  tendency
20 Minority  male adults work  the equivalent  of 271 eight  hour days;  female  adults  293;  and children 133.
For the majority  household  members  the averages  are: 145, 188,  and 65, respectively.
21 We tested  a number  of alternative  specifications  (without  the squared  land terms;  including  all other
household  characteristics;  including  commune  dummnies;  limiting  the sample  to households  in communes  where
both groups  live). Without  exception,  we get strong  positive  and significant  effects  of minorily  household  status
on hours of farm  work.
15and sometimes illegal products are. Minorities have often lived in the same areas for
generations. Their long confinement in these areas has no doubt fostered a lot of specialized
agro-environmental knowledge that helps to optimize land use and maximize output. These
effects are likely to be reinforced by the minority group's lack of more traditional alternatives,
and their greater inaccessibility and distance from public interest and policing.
Thus it can be argued that the forces that led to the high concentrations of minorities in
upland and mountainous areas may well have the effect that the marginal returns to land are
actually higher for them. In this case, as a result of the poorer ethnic group expenencing lower-
access to off-farm work, reduced access to good quality flat land and complementary inputs
such as capital, it compensates in ways that result in higher returns to land. Nonetheless,
despite the minorities'  additional efforts and specialized knowledge, their consumption
remains lower. 22
Returns to location. A similar comparison can be made of the estimated commune effects
(the r's  in equation (3)), but only for the regression run on the sample of communes that are
home to households from both groups. 23 Figure 4 plots the commune coefficients estimated
for the majority against those estimated for the minority group. With very few exceptions,
returns to a specific geographic location are higher for the minorities. In a way similar to what
we found for land, the minorities appear to be specializing and drawing greater advantage
from location attributes. As a result they achieve higher returns, including compared to the
majority living in the same places. This partly, though only partly, compensates for lower
consumption.
Summarizing the regressions. We find that excluding location results in severe omitted
variable bias. This reflects the fact that non-geographic variables tend to be geographically
correlated. Geography also independently affects living standards as indicated by significant
commune fixed effects.
We also find that where you live matters much more to the ethnic minorities' living
standards than to the majority's. Living in a bad area tends to inhibit their characteristics more
severely. As noted in section 3, greater geographic variance exists among minority
households. Because omitted geographic variables for the minorities tend to be more
positively correlated with desirable household characteristics, omitting the fixed effects
produces results that tend to overestimate the returns to desirable household characteristics.
22 An implication  of the findings  is that  there are land transfers  from majority  to minority  that would  raise
average  consumption  over  both groups,  and enhance  both efficiency  and equity.  Such  trades are not occurring
given non-existent  land  markets.  The administrative  land allocation  appears  to be creating  efficiency  losses.  The
situation  is akin to the classic  case of inequality  impeding  growth  whereby  the poor have  higher marginal  returns
because  they can't get inputs such  as credit  (Binswanger  et al. 1995).
2  The coefficients  are estimated  relative  to a left out commune,  and so change  according  to the omitted
communes.
16Land is to some degree offsetting because of its response to added effort and input by
minority households making up for their lack of outside income earning opportunities in
certain areas. There is also evidence of compensating effects of location. A component of
consumption is due purely to where a household resides. Average consumption is lower for
the minority groups but absolutely more of that consumption is due to where they live.
Comparing well and poorly-endowed areas where minorities live, we see larger
differences in educational attainments, land assets, household size, and other attributes than
are spatially evident among the majority. This suggests that at least some part of the structural  -
difference in living standards is geographic, taking the form, for example, of a minimum level
of public spending to areas where minorities are concentrated, affecting the quality of
education and other infrastructure, accessibility to services and information, and off-farm
income-earning opportunities. Such attributes tend to reinforce differences due to
characteristics. In contrast, controlling for characteristics, where the majority live matters less
to their consumption levels.
6. Aggregate Differences in Returns
As we have seen, there are both positive and negative compensating influences on ethnic
inequality emanating from differences in the returns to the same characteristics. We now ask
how much, in aggregate, differences in returns account for differences in living standards. We
decompose the between group difference in log per capita consumption expenditures using the
methods discussed in section 2. We use alternatively the majority and minorit,  parameters as
reference weights. The decomposition is undefined for the full sample with commune fixed
effects because of the missing parameter when only one group is present in the sample for a
commune. 24 For this reason we also do the decomposition for the sample limited to
households living in communes where both minority and majority are found. This allows the
decomposition to also be done with the fixed effects model. Restricting the saimple  this way
also allows us to test for the possibility that differences in characteristics across the full
sample reflect in part differences among the majority households across communes in which
very few minority households are found. Table 4 presents the results.
For the whole sample, we find that the difference in log consumption per capita between
the majority and minority groups is almost equally explained by differences in characteristics
(52 percent) and differences in the returns to those characteristics (48 percent). The
component due to characteristics increases slightly when we use the minority parameter
weights instead (56 percent).
This changes dramatically when we limit the sample to communes in which both groups
are found. Then we find negligible difference due to characteristics, with disparities in living
24  The decomposition  is highly sensitive  to the reference  when  the regressors  are not observed  for all groups.
17standards being entirely attributable to different returns. This is true using either reference
weights, and with and without geographical fixed effects. When we omit communes without
minority households, this greatly compresses the variance in household characteristics. The
positive component attributable to differences in characteristics in the whole sample, is
entirely due to the advantageous characteristics of majority households in non-minority areas.
In order to get a sense of the extent of structural inequality within communes, we next set
a reference household-where  the reference is overall sample mean characteristics excluding
location-common  to all areas and both ethnic groups. We then predict, based on the
regression coefficients allowing for commune fixed effects, what log per capita expenditures
would be in each commune for each ethnic group if all characteristics were identical except
for location and ethnicity. For each commune there are either one or two predicted values
depending on whether both groups reside there. Two predicted values enables us to compare
the groups within a commune controlling for household characteristics.
Figure 5 graphs predicted log per capita expenditures for the majority against the same for
the minority for the communes where both groups reside. Thus, similarly to figure 4, each
point represents one commune. The figure clearly shows that even when household
characteristics including location are identical, minority households in Viet Nam have lower
predicted living standards than majority households. This again underlines the finding that,
although a large part of ethnic inequality controlling for differences in household
characteristics can be attributed to geographical attributes, not all of it can.
Our results point to the importance of differing returns to economic characteristics. A less
significant role is played by inter-group differences in household characteristics other than in
where they live.
7.  Conclusions
In principle, there are two possible approaches to redressing the ethnic inequality found in
many developing countries. One approach assumes that the model generating the incomes of
the better off group will work if only it is applied to the other group. The second approach
assumes that the two models are fundamentally different, and that only by working with the
actual model appropriate to the worse off group will the ethnic inequality be redressed. This
paper tries to determine which approach is the right one in the case of Viet Nam.
The differences in levels of living in northern rural Viet Nam are due in part to the fact
that the minorities live in less productive areas, with difficult terrain, poor infrastructure and
lower accessibility to the market economy and off-farm work. There are large regional
differences in living standards and considerable immobility, so that geographic disparities
tend to be persistent.
But disparities in levels of living between the minority and majority are not just a matter
of geography. We also find large differences within geographical areas, which persist even
18after controlling for household characteristics. Interestingly, a non-geographic model of living
standards actually hides the magnitude of these intra-locational disparities. This is because
geographic characteristics matter more to the minorities and the geographic effects are
correlated with their other characteristics. Living in areas with worse infrastructure, worse
access to markets and so on, tends to be associated with less rewarding non-geographic
household characteristics, and this effect is stronger for the minorities.
A model of living standards that allows for ethnic differences and geographic effects thus
provides two main insights. First, a larger component of the variance in minoiity consumption
is due to where a household lives. This holds even when focusing on the communes in which
both groups are found. Second, allowing for geographic effects gives a very different picture
of the structure of returns to given household characteristics-notably  education and land. In
this setting, there appears to be a severe bias in assessments of the role played by differences
in returns to non-geographic characteristics in models that do not allow for geographic effects
on living standards. We have argued that the most plausible explanation for this bias is that
there is unobserved geographic heterogeneity in the quality of land and education. Our results
are consistent with these omitted geographic differences in land quality being negatively
correlated with land quantities. Education quality disparities on the other hand appear to be
positively correlated with schooling quantities, though much more so for the rainorities. The
methods used here can deal with geographic endogeneity of characteristics, but there may also
be latent within-commune differences in education quality, for example. We could then be
overestimating returns to the majority relative to the minorities if the returns to quality are
higher for the majority or if inter-household differences in education quantity within
communes are more responsive to latent quality differences for the majority than minority
households. There is no obvious reason why these conditions would hold, but they cannot be
ruled out.
We find that, at given characteristics, there are systematic differences not attributable to
where you live. Indeed, if we look solely at communes where both groups live, differences in
characteristics no longer account for any of the difference in average consumption. These
results lead us to conclude that fundamentally different models generate incomnes  for the
majority and minority groups. This need not be the result of current discrimination; historical
processes-  possibly including a history of past discrimination-could  well be the source.
However, it is not the case that minority groups obtain lower returns to all characteristics.
The ethnic differences in returns are more complex than that. A rational response to the social
or economic exclusion of an ethnic sub-group is to retreat into specific activities, or strive to
obtain higher returns to certain characteristics that cannot be easily discriminated against. In a
poor rural economy such as Viet Nam, opportunities for income reducing discrimination are
largely confined to certain activities, notably the off-farm wage labor market. How hard you
work your own land or what you cultivate are unlikely to be among the activities that can be
discriminated against. Yet, of course, the returns to one's land depend heavily on own effort
19and family labor endowments. A possible outcome then is that the disadvantaged ethnic group
achieves higher returns in activities such as subsistence farming, gathering forest products and
cultivation of non-traditional crops.
We find strong evidence for this effect in the marginal returns to land for the ethnic
minorities.  The component attributed to differences in returns in the decomposition is picking
up other such "compensating effects." For example, the pure returns to location-even  when
in remote, inhospitable areas-tend  also to be higher for the minorities. Such behavior
improves their consumption levels, though it is not sufficient to overcome the large
differential with the majority.
In reducing poverty among Viet Nam's minorities and reducing this dimension of
inequality, there is an important role for geographically targeted programs aimed at poor
areas. However, our results also suggest that it is not sufficient to only target interventions to
poor areas, even with relatively high concentrations of ethnic minority groups. Policies for
fighting poverty among the minorities that assume the Kinh model will continue to be
ineffective. The paper's results clearly point to the need for specific interventions within
geographically targeted poor area development programs to be appropriately tailored to, and
narrowly focused on, the problems, needs, and situation of minority households.  Only in this
way can policy eventually succeed in raising minority household returns to given
characteristics to the levels enjoyed by neighboring majority households.
Effective policies should also recognize the compensating behaviors we have identified,
and other fonns of behavioral responses on the part of the minorities. A history of lower
returns to certain non-geographic characteristics has generated higher returns to land and
location for the minority groups.  This is inequality reducing though it may well reinforce
ethnic differences in the longer term. The minorities have developed a comparative advantage
in location but it is also location that makes them more remote, more difficult to integrate and
costlier to reach with social services and physical infrastructure. In helping redress current
inequalities it will be necessary to open up options for minority groups both by assuring that
they are not disadvantaged in (for example) labor markets, and by breaking the conditions that
have caused their isolation and social exclusion.
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22Table  1: Descriptive  Statistics
Majority Sample  Minority Sample
Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.
Per capita expenditure  1,246,575  682,291  930,051  450,077
Household size  4.68  1.94  5.55  2.43
Prop. of children 0 to 6  0.17  0.19  0.21  0.19
Prop. of members 7 to 16  0.21  0.21  0.23  0.20
Prop of male adults  0.27  0.17  0.27  0.15
Prop. of female adults  0.34  0.19  0.29  0.15
Single member household  0.03  0.18  0.01  0.09
Couple  0.05  0.21  0.02  0.14
Couple and child  0.10  0.30  0.08  0.27
Couple and two children  0.17  0.37  0.12  0.33
Couple and three or more children  0.32  0.47  0.38  0.49
Three generation household  0.18  0.39  0.24  0.43
Otherhouseholdtype  0.15  0.35  0.14  0.35
Age of household head  44.8  14.9  41.2  14.0
Male household head  0.76  0.43  0.87  0.34
Most educated person is illiterate/semi-literate  0.03  0.16  0.12  0.32
Most educated has 1-5 yrs primary  0.12  0.32  0.27  0.44
Most educated has 1-3 yrs middle school  0.17  0.37  0.18  0.39
Most educated has 1-4 yrs high school  0.53  0.50  0.31  0.46
Most educated has vocational education  0.12  0.33  0.11  0.31
Most educated has university education  0.03  0.17  0.01  0.11
Area of annual irrigated crop land (m2)  1,749.5  1633.7  573.4  1218.3
Area of annual nonirrigated crop land (m2)  1,128.7  3,210.3  4,172.6  4695.7
Area of perennial crop land (m2)  309.8  1,268.2  582.2  1,228.6
Area of forest land (m2)  175.7  1,540.4  1,297.2  3,933.5
Area of water surface land (m2)  94.1  612.7  66.2  218.1
Area of other land (m2)  155.9  1,659.1  995.4  3267.6
Prop of irrigated land of good quality  0.36  0.40  0.06  0.22
Prop of nonirrigated land of good quality  0.06  0.22  0.04  0.14
H'hold gets income from relatives abroad  0.03  0.16  0.01  0.10
Number of observations  2,254  466
Source: The data are from the 1992-93 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey.
23Table 2: Accessibility to Facilities By Ethnicity
Majority ethnic  Minority ethnic
groups  groups
Mean  St. dev  Mean  St.dev
Market  in the commune  0.53  0.50  0.13  0.34
Periodic  market  0.15  0.36  0.36  0.48
Distance  to closest  market (kIn)  1.00  2.00  3.15  3.72
Public transport  0.48  0.50  0.56  0.50
Radio station  0.52  0.50  0.15  0.36
Health care clinic  0.96  0.19  0.84  0.37
Distance  to closest  hospital (kIn)  8.60  5.40  11.90  7.80
Lower secondary  school  0.94  0.24  0.83  0.38
Distance  to closest lower secondary  school (kin)  0.20  0.95  2.40  6.50
Upper secondary  school  0.10  0.31  0.11  0.32
Distance  to closest  upper secondary  school  (km)  6.10  4.70  10.30  7.03
Distance  to district  center (kmn)  9.60  7.80  19.50  15.30
Distance  to closest  post office (km)  3.80  4.20  6.90  6.00
Unskilled  labor employment  is available  0.66  0.47  0.44  0.50
Commercial  enterprise  exists  0.49  0.50  0.26  0.44
Note:  Unless  noted, the table gives  proportions  of majority  and minority  households  who live in communes  with
each  facility  or attribute. For example,  53 percent  of majority  group  households  reside  in a commune  that has a
permanent  market  versus  only 13 percent  of ethnic  minority  households. The distance  variables  represent
average  kilometers  from a household's  commune  center  to the closest  such  facility.
24Table 3: Determinants of Living Standards
Commune Fixed Effects
Majority  Minority  Majority  Minority
Coef  t-ratio  Coef  t-ratio  Coef  t-ratio  Coef  t-ratio
Constant  13.12  92.0  12.73  43.15  13.35  97.64  12.49  32.68
Household size (log)  -0.27  4.66  -0.29  3.23  -0.33  6.89  -0.4  3.91
Prop. of members 7-16  0.48  6.32  0.25  1.84  0.37  5.49  0.25  2.21
Prop of male adults  0.78  7.19  0.85  3.89  0.60  6.75  0.60  3.33
Prop. of female adults  0.60  5.97  0.50  3.01  0.41  4.12  0.36  2.30
Single member household  -0.08  0.96  0.004  0.02  -0.14  1.89  -0.12  0.49
Couple and child  0.00  0.06  0.06  0.41  -0.11  2.26  0.04  0.42
Couple and two children  0.07  1.19  0.11  0.71  -0.05  0.84  0.04  0.27
Couple and three or more children  0.04  0.61  0.12  0.66  -0.09  1.44  0.01  0.07
Three generation household  0.04  0.56  0.09  0.64  -0.06  1.05  0.07  0.54
Otherhouseholdtype  0.02  0.30  0.13  0.80  -0.07  1.24  0.12  0.84
Age of  head  0.01  2.47  0.005  0.41  0.01  3.17  0.01  1.06
Age of  head squared  -0.00  2.49  -0.000  0.44  -1.2e-4  3.12  -1.6e-4  1.11
Malehouseholdhead  0.01  0.40  0.01  0.10  0.02  0.69  0.06  1.15
Most educated: 1-5 yrs primary  0.20  2.57  0.56  5.33  0.17  2.36  0.19  3.53
Most educated: 1-3 yrs middle school  0.29  3.86  0.61  7.74  0.26  3.55  0.20  2.77
Most educated: 1-4 yrs high school  0.40  4.85  0.74  7.07  0.38  4.90  0.31  3.96
Most educated: vocational education  0.53  6.59  0.78  6.88  0.53  6.93  0.36  3.79
Most educated: university education  0.79  8.18  0.81  3.26  0.71  7.93  0.51  2.31
Irrigated land  -3.2e-5  1.40  1.3e-4  1.83  1.2e-5  0.71  2.0e-4  4.06
Irrigated land squared  4.0e-9  2.54  -8.9e-9  0.71  1.4e-9  1.34  -2.3e-8  3.09
Nonirrigated land  -4.8e-6  0.39  8.6e-6  0.50  8.6e-6  2.03  l.9e-5  0.83
Nonirrigated land squared  1.0e-10  0.74  -1.5e-10  0.28  -9.5e-11  2.00  -2.3e-10  0.30
Perennial crop land  3.8e-5  1.33  5.9e-5  1.34  1.5e-5  0.56  1.le-4  1.94
Perennial crop land squared  3.0e-10  0.21  -3.0e-9  0.54  2.3e-10  0.18  -8.3e-9  1.31
Forest land  -1.4e-6  0.12  1.6e-5  0.96  1.9e-5  1.99  1.7e-5  0.96
Forest land squared  3.3e-11  0.13  -3.2e-10  0.63  -4.7e-10  2.27  -5.0e-10  0.98
Water surface land  8.4e-5  2.88  4.0e-4  2.92  1.  le-4  3.68  3.8e-4  2.62
Water surface land squarecl  -4.4e-9  2.42  -2.2e-7  2.08  -5.7e-9  2.94  -1.8e-7  1.66
Other land  -1.8e-5  1.01  3.2e-6  0.21  5.4e-6  0.56  2.5e-5  0.97
Otherlandsquared  3.2e-10  1.25  l.le-10  0.22  1.5e-11  0.11  -5.6e-10  0.64
Prop good quality irrigated land  0.004  0.08  -0.05  0.46  0.03  0.89  0.02  0.34
Prop good quality nonirrigated land  0.07  1.54  0.24  1.90  -0.01  0.25  0.20  2.74
Income from relatives abroad (yes/no)  0.35  4.57  0.34  3.49  0.27  5.40  0.24  4.82
Observations
F  2,254  466  2,254  466
Prob > F  (28,80) =  27.44  (24,25)  =  119.81  (32, 80)=6975.05 (19, 25) = 208.10
R-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Root MSE  0.25  0.46  0.48  0.61
.4007  .3833  .3398  .3346
Note: the regression omits the proportion of members aged 0-6; households that consist of a couple; illiterate
education status.  We leave out the commune fixed effects for ease of presentation. t-ratios are estimated using
the robust cluster option in STATA 6.0 (1999)
25Table 4: Decomposing  Sources  of Ethnic  Inequality
Source of difference in log mean
Difference in log  consumption
consumption per  Different  Different returns
Reference  capita  characteristics  to characteristics
Whole sample
Commune effects?
No  majority  .2967  .1532  .1433
No  minority  .2967  .1666  .1300
Common communes only
Commune effects?
No  majority  .2498  -.0086  .2582
No  minority  .2498  .0493  .2004
Yes  majority  .2498  .0081  .2417
Yes  minority  .2498  -.0536  .3034
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